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Administrative Law: 
The Trouble with Counting1 
 
Jodi L. Short 
 
Regulation counting has become a cornerstone of U.S. 
deregulatory policy with the issuance of Executive Order 13,771 (“the 
EO”), “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs.”  To 
promote deregulatory goals, the EO requires administrative agencies to 
repeal two regulations for every one they propose or issue, leading 
many to refer to it as the “2-for-1” Order.  The Office of Management 
and Budget (“OMB”) has published detailed guidance instructing 
agencies how to implement the EO, which constrains their ability to 
promulgate new regulations under their statutory mandates.2  
The idea of regulation counting that motivates the EO emerges 
from a larger intellectual project arguing that economic growth is being 
hampered by the “sheer quantity of regulations.”3  In a string of 
studies,4 researchers have attempted to establish this relationship  
by counting regulations and correlating these counts to various 
macroeconomic outcomes of interest, like U.S. employment, 
productivity, and competitiveness.  
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from Jodi L. Short, The Trouble with 
Counting: Cutting Through the Rhetoric of Red Tape Cutting, 103 MINN. L. 
REV. 93 (2018). 
 2. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB 
MEMO. NO. M-17-21, MEMORANDUM: IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 
13,771, TITLED “REDUCING REGULATION AND CONTROLLING REGULATORY 
COSTS” (2017) (hereinafter “OMB GUIDANCE”). 
 3. Omar Al-Ubaydli & Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData: A Numerical 
Database on Industry-Specific Regulations for All United States Industries and 
Federal Regulations, 1997-2012, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 109, 110 (2017). 
 4. See, e.g., Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 110; Clyde 
Wayne Crews, Jr., Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the 
Federal Regulatory State, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (2017); Brent 
Coffey, et al., Regulators and Redskins, 153 PUB. CHOICE 191 (2012); John W. 
Dawson & John J. Seater, Federal Regulation and Aggregate Economic 
Growth, 18 J. ECON. GROWTH 137 (2013); Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei 
Shleifer, The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation, 120 Q. J. 
ECON. 1445 (2005); J. B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: 
The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 
757 (2003); Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: 
Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 808 
(2001). 
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This intellectual project appears to have two principal aims.  The 
first is political.  Regulation-counting studies radically simplify 
complex regulatory phenomena to make criticisms of regulation salient 
to lawmakers and the general public and to bolster political support for 
deregulatory policies.  The second is empirical and, ultimately, legal.  
By producing scholarly literature documenting a correlation between 
the number of regulations and negative economic outcomes, 
antiregulatory scholars and advocates generate a body of empirical 
research that agencies and courts can rely on in implementing and 
upholding the legality of deregulatory counting policies like 2-for-1. 
Courts should not be fooled.  Regulation counting is not a rational 
basis for regulatory policy.  The Administrative Procedure Act requires 
agencies to articulate a rational connection between the facts before the 
agency and the policy choices made by the agency.  Administrative 
decisions that lack a rational foundation are “arbitrary and capricious” 
and must be struck down by reviewing courts.5  Agencies often cite 
empirical studies to demonstrate the rationality of their decisions, and 
reviewing courts will find agency decisions arbitrary and capricious if 
they are not sufficiently justified by the empirical evidence before the 
agency.6 
The logic of regulation-counting studies that empirically tie 
regulation counts to macroeconomic outcomes appears calculated to 
resonate with widely accepted efficiency rationales for cost-benefit 
analysis (“CBA”).  CBA, instituted through a series of executive orders 
issued by presidents dating back to Jimmy Carter,7 rests on the premise 
that agencies should exercise statutory discretion to make policy 
decisions that maximize aggregate welfare, meaning the benefits of 
regulation net its costs.8  There currently is broad scholarly and 
political consensus that “Presidents can legitimately influence the 
development of regulations—at least when the goal is to ensure that the 
regulations promote societal welfare to the extent permitted by law.”9 
                                                 
 5. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
 6. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. St. Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29 (1983); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (2011). 
 7. See Exec. Order No. 12,044; Exec. Order No. EO 12,291; Exec. Order 
No. 12,866; Exec. Order No. 13,422; Exec. Order No. 13,563. 
 8. Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2017). 
 9. Caroline Cecot & Michael A. Livermore, The One-In, Two-Out 
Executive Order is a Zero, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
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It is not surprising, then, that supporters of the EO have suggested 
that 2-for-1 is merely an extension of cost-benefit analysis and thus can 
be rationalized on similar grounds.10  The difficulty with this gambit is 
that 2-for-1 explicitly rejects the well-established efficiency 
maximization lodestar on which CBA rests.  Contrary to CBA, 2-for-1 
addresses only the costs (and not the benefits) of regulations, and the 
OMB Guidance Memorandum implementing the Order expressly 
prohibits agencies from considering the benefits of regulation in 
deciding which regulations must go and which may stay.11  This is, 
quite simply, unjustifiable under fundamental principles of welfare 
economics: “At least as far as economic theory is concerned, any new 
regulation that offers more benefits than costs should be undertaken, 
regardless of its contribution to the aggregate regulatory costs to 
society.”12 
If the EO and agency decisions made pursuant to it cannot be 
justified by the efficiency rationale underlying CBA, they must rest on 
some other principled basis.  This is where regulation counting studies 
come in.  Such studies promise to provide empirical support for the 
policy of reducing regulation counts in the service of promoting desired 
(and ostensibly more efficient) macroeconomic outcomes.  But as 
explained below, they fail to deliver on that promise and, thus, such 
studies cannot rationalize the EO or administrative decisions based on 
it.  Regulation-counting studies do not, and cannot, rationalize 
deregulatory policies like 2-for-1 because based on prevailing standards 
of social scientific research they are, themselves, irrational and 
empirically unsound.  
The trouble with using regulation counts to justify regulatory 
actions is that they do not validly measure a construct that can be 
theorized to cause economic outcomes.  It is commonly claimed, for 
instance, that regulation counts are a proxy for the “costs” or “burdens” 
of regulation on regulated entities.  While these claims have undeniable 
political appeal, a tally of the number of regulations or regulatory 
mandates on the books simply does not measure the costs or burdens of 
                                                 
 10. See, e.g., Ted Geyer, et al., Evaluating the Trump Administration’s 
Regulatory Reform Program (2017) (Brookings Center); Benjamin M. Miller, 
et al., Inching Toward Reform: Trump’s Deregulation and Its Implementation 
(2017) (Rand Corp.); Consumer’s Guide to Regulatory Impact Analysis: Ten 
Tips for Being an Informed Policymaker, 8:2 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 187 
(2017). 
 11. OMB GUIDANCE, supra note 2. 
 12. Geyer, et al., supra note 10, at 5. 
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regulation because it does not account for at least nine important 
features of regulatory law. 
First, regulation counts do not account for variation in the weight 
of regulations.  For instance, a regulation that requires mine operators 
to put their correct address and telephone number on forms submitted 
to the regulator13 counts the same as a regulation requiring that 
automakers comply with EPA’s complex and demanding greenhouse 
gas fleet average requirements.14 
Second, regulation counts do not account for variation in 
regulations’ scope of coverage.  A Department of Justice regulation 
provides multiple mandatory criteria applicable to the vanishingly 
small population of individuals who wish to claim a financial reward 
for disclosing information relating to the unlawful handling of nuclear 
materials.15  These regulatory mandates count the same as those found 
in Occupational Health and Safety Agency regulations applicable to 
millions of U.S. workplaces. 
Third, regulation counts do not account for the object of regulatory 
requirements.  A large number of regulations apply not to private 
regulated entities but to the government’s actions. These regulations 
require transparency, due process, and fair administration for the 
benefit and protection of regulated entities.  Yet regulation counters add 
them to the costs and burdens on regulated entities. 
Fourth, regulation counts overlook structural relationships among 
regulations.  For example, many regulations contain exceptions that 
limit their applicability and thus their cost or burden.  Others provide 
alternative means of complying with a primary regulatory command, 
providing regulated entities with greater flexibility and lessening costs 
and burdens.  Some regulations simply clarify other regulations, 
providing greater clarity and certainty in application of the law for the 
benefit (and often at the request) of regulated entities. 
Fifth, regulation counts ignore basic grammatical conventions 
within regulations.  Sometimes, the mandatory language in regulations 
is explicitly negated by words like “no” or “not.”  Others, it is 
contained in questions—for instance, “Must I do X?”—which are 
answered in the negative.  Regulation counters add these to the tally of 
costs and burdens nonetheless.  
Sixth, regulation counts do not account for enforcement levels. 
Regulations are enforced with wildly varying degrees of stringency and 
                                                 
 13. 30 C.F.R. § 41.30 (2017). 
 14. 40 C.F.R. § 86.1818-12 (2017). 
 15. 28 C.F.R. § 13.6 (2017). 
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frequency, with some enforced vigorously and regularly, others 
enforced with moderate stringency or only sporadically, and many 
languishing entirely unenforced.  These all count the same. 
Seventh, regulation counts count conditional benefits as burdens. 
Many regulations set forth mandatory criteria and procedures for 
obtaining valuable benefits from the federal government, including 
grants, loans, leases, and entitlements.  These rules need not be 
followed by those who do not seek the benefits.  Those who elect to 
follow the rules—for instance, to obtain a mineral lease for oil and gas 
exploration and development in federal waters16—do so voluntarily and 
for their own often substantial benefit and cannot be properly 
characterized as burdened by such rules. 
Eighth, regulation counts do not account for the benefits of 
regulation that accrue to regulated entities.  There is empirical evidence 
that in certain contexts, regulated entities benefit from their own 
regulation—for instance, companies enjoy lower costs of capital in 
countries with robust securities-regulation enforcement.17  Regulation 
counts make no attempt to net out the benefits regulated entities enjoy 
from regulation from whatever costs they may incur in implementing it. 
Ninth, regulation counts do not account for the source of 
regulatory requirements.  Many regulations repeat verbatim language 
from the statute authorizing them.  Even if these might fairly be said to 
create costs or burdens on regulated entities, these costs or burdens are 
not agency created, thus they cannot be corrected by agencies, because 
agencies are not at liberty to repeal statutory commands. 
Taken together, these mistakes infect regulation counts with two 
fundamental fallacies that disqualify them as meaningful measures of 
the costs or burdens of regulation on regulated entities.  First, 
regulation counts are tremendously inflated, because they double count 
(and triple count or more) many regulatory requirements, because they 
count subtractions from regulatory costs and burdens as additions to 
regulatory costs and burdens, and because they count outright benefits 
to regulated entities as costs and burdens on them.  Second, regulation 
counts are unreliable because they equate things that are wildly 
incommensurate with one another and aggregate them into a single 
measure. 
For these reasons, regulation counts do not provide a rational basis 
for regulatory policymaking.  Empirical studies employing them to 
                                                 
 16. 30 C.F.R. § 550.200 et seq. (2017). 
 17. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 230 (2007). 
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support deregulatory policies should be viewed with extreme 
skepticism on judicial review.  Government officials should be wary of 
claims that regulation counting will help them reform their regulatory 
systems.  Likewise, political rhetoric deploying regulation counts 
should be vigorously contested because it crowds out meaningful 
dialogue about specific social and economic problems and appropriate 
regulatory responses. 
